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Abstract. We present a survey of Voice over IP security research. Our goal is
to provide a roadmap for researchers seeking to understand existing capabilities
and, and to identify gaps in addressing the numerous threats and vulnerabilities
present in VoIP systems. We also briefly discuss the implications of our findings
with respect to actual vulnerabilities reported in a variety VoIP products.
1 Introduction
Voice over IP technologies are being increasingly adopted by consumers, enterprises,
and telecoms operators due to their potential for higher flexibility, richer feature set,
and reduced costs relative to their Public Switched Telephony Network (PSTN) coun-
terparts. At their core, VoIP technologies enable the transmission of voice in any IP
network, including the Internet. Because of the need to seamlessly interoperate with
the existing telephony infrastructure, the new features, and the speed of development
and deployment, VoIP protocols and products have been repeatedly found to contain
numerous vulnerabilities [16] that have been exploited [19]. As a result, a fair amount
of research has been directed towards addressing some of these issues. However, the
effort is unbalanced, with little effort is spent on some highly deserving problem areas.
We have conducted a comprehensive survey of VoIP security research, complement-
ing our previous work that analyzed known vulnerabilities [16]. Our long-term goal is
four-fold. First, to create a roadmap of existing work in securing VoIP, towards reducing
the start-up effort required by other researchers to initiate research in this space. Sec-
ond, to identify gaps in existing research, and to help inform the security community of
challenges and opportunities for further work. Third, to provide an overall sanity check
on the overall VoIP security research ecosystem, using known vulnerabilities as a form
of ground truth. Finally, in the context of the VAMPIRE project1 (which supported this
work), to provide guidance as to what further work in needed to better understand and
analyze the activities of VoIP-system attackers. Naturally, such ambitious goals require
significantly more space than is available in a single conference paper.
In this paper, we provide a representative sample of the research works we surveyed.
We classify these works according to the class of threat they seek to address, using the
VoIP Security Alliance (VoIPSA) [54] threat taxonomy. Although we were forced to
omit a large number of related works (which we hope to present in a comprehensive
form in due time), this survey should be a good starting point for anyone interested in
conducting research on VoIP security. We also briefly discuss the implications of our
findings with respect to actual vulnerabilities reported in a variety VoIP products.
In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 gives a brief overview of SIP, one of the
most popular VoIP technologies. Section 3 summarizes the threat model defined by the
VoIP Security Alliance. We then present our survey of the research literature on VoIP
security in Section 4, and discuss some of the implications in Section 5.
1 http://vampire.gforge.inria.fr/
2 SIP Overview
SIP [42] is an application-layer protocol standardized by the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF), and is designed to support the setup of bidirectional communication ses-
sions including, but not limited to, VoIP calls. It is somewhat similar to HTTP, in that
it is text-based, has a request-response structure, and uses a user authentication mech-
anism based on the HTTP Digest Authentication. However, it is an inherently state-
ful protocol that supports interaction with multiple network components (e.g., PSTN
bridges), and can operate over UDP, TCP, and SCTP.
The main SIP entities are endpoints (softphones or physical devices), a proxy server,
a registrar, a redirect server, and a location server. The registrar, proxy and redirect
servers may be combined, or they may be independent entities. Endpoints communi-
cate with a registrar to indicate their presence. This information is stored in the location
server. A user may be registered via multiple endpoints simultaneously. During call
setup, the endpoint communicates with the proxy, which uses the location server to de-
termine where the call should be routed to. This may be another endpoint in the same
network (e.g., in the same enterprise), or another proxy server in another network. Alter-
natively, endpoints may use a redirect server to directly determine where a call should
be directed to; redirect servers consult the location server in the same way that proxy
servers operate during call setup. Once an end-to-end channel has been established
(through one or more proxies) between the two endpoints, SIP negotiates the session
parameters (codecs, RTP ports, etc.) using the Session Description Protocol (SDP).
In a two-party call setup between Alice and Bob, Alice sends an INVITE message to
her proxy server, optionally containing session parameter information encoded within
SDP. The proxy forwards this message directly to Bob, if Alice and Bob are users of the
same domain. If Bob is registered in a different domain, the message will be relayed to
Bob’s proxy, and thence to Bob. The message may be forwarded to several endpoints,
if Bob is registered from multiple locations. While the call is being set up, Alice is sent
RINGING messages. Once the call has been accepted, an OK message is sent to Alice,
containing Bob’s preferred parameters encoded within SDP. Alice responds with an
ACK message. Alice’s session parameter preferences may be encoded in the INVITE
or the ACK message. Following this exchange, the two endpoints can begin transmitting
voice, video or other content using the agreed-upon media transport protocol, typically
RTP. While the signaling traffic may be relayed through a number of SIP proxies, the
media traffic is exchanged directly between the two endpoints. When bridging different
networks, e.g., PSTN and SIP, media gateways may disrupt the end-to-end nature of the
media transfer to translate content between the formats supported by these networks.
There are many other protocol interactions supported by SIP, that cover a number of
common (and uncommon) scenarios including call forwarding (manual or automatic),
conference calling, voicemail, etc. Typically, this is done by semantically overloading
SIP messages such that they can play various roles in different parts of the call.
SIP can use S/MIME to carry complex authentication payloads, including public
key certificates. When TCP is used as the transport protocol, TLS can be used to protect
the SIP messages. TLS is required for communication among proxies, registrars and
redirect servers, but only recommended between endpoints and proxies or registrars.
IPsec may also be used to protect all communications, regardless of transport protocol.
3 VoIP Threats
As a starting point, we use the taxonomy provided by the Voice over IP Security Al-
liance (VoIPSA) [54]. VoIPSA is a vendor-neutral, not for profit organization composed
of VoIP and security vendors, organizations and individuals with an interest in securing
VoIP protocols, products and installations. In addition, we place the surveyed vulnera-
bilities within the traditional threat space of confidentiality, integrity, availability (CIA).
Finally, we consider whether the vulnerabilities exploit bugs in the protocol, implemen-
tation or system configuration. In future work, we hope to expand the number of views
to the surveyed vulnerabilities and to provide more in-depth analysis.
The VoIPSA security threat taxonomy defines the security threats against VoIP de-
ployments, services, and end users. The key elements of this taxonomy are:
1. Social threats are aimed directly against humans. For example, misconfigurations,
bugs or bad protocol interactions in VoIP systems may enable or facilitate attacks
that misrepresent the identity of malicious parties to users. Such attacks may then
act as stepping stones to further attacks such as phishing, theft of service, or un-
wanted contact (spam).
2. Eavesdropping, interception, and modification threats cover situations where
an adversary can unlawfully and without authorization from the parties concerned
listen in on the signaling (call setup) or the content of a VoIP session, and possibly
modify aspects of that session while avoiding detection. Examples of such attacks
include call re-routing and interception of unencrypted RTP sessions.
3. Denial of service threats have the potential to deny users access to VoIP services.
This may be particularly problematic in the case of emergencies, or when a DoS at-
tack affects all of a user’s or organization’s communication capabilities (i.e., when
all VoIP and data communications are multiplexed over the same network which
can be targeted through a DoS attack). Such attacks may be VoIP-specific (exploit-
ing flaws in the call setup or the implementation of services), or VoIP-agnostic (e.g.,
generic traffic flooding attacks). They may also involve attacks with physical com-
ponents (e.g., physically disconnecting or severing a cable) or through computing
or other infrastructures (e.g., disabling the DNS server, or shutting down power).
4. Service abuse threats covers the improper use of VoIP services, especially (but not
exclusively) in situations where such services are offered in a commercial setting.
Examples of such threats include toll fraud and billing avoidance [51, 52].
5. Physical access threats refer to inappropriate/unauthorized physical access to VoIP
equipment, or to the physical layer of the network.
6. Interruption of services threats refer to non-intentional problems that may nonethe-
less cause VoIP services to become unusable or inaccessible. Examples of such
threats include loss of power due to inclement weather, resource exhaustion due to
over-subscription, and performance issues that degrade call quality.
4 Survey of VoIP Security Research
In the this section, we classify various research papers across the first four elements of
the VoIPSA taxonomy (the last two relate to physical and non-security issues). We also
include a cross-cutting category, which includes work that covers multiple areas (e.g.,
proposing a security architecture), and an overviews category that includes works that
survey vulnerabilities, threats, and security mechanisms. We give an indication as to
how many total pieces of related work (including those described in the text) could be
classified in that category but were omitted due to space limitations. The works that are
discussed offer a representative view of the type of research activity in these problem
areas.
Overviews (36 items) Persky gives a very detailed description of several VoIP vulner-
abilities [32]. A long discussion of threats and security solutions is given by Thermos
and Takanen [53]. Cao and Malik [8] examine the vulnerabilities that arise from in-
troducing VoIP technologies into the communications systems in critical infrastructure
applications. They examine the usual threats and vulnerabilities, and discuss mitigation
techniques. They conclude by providing some recommendations and best practices to
operators of such systems.
Butcher et al. [7] overview security issues and mechanisms for VoIP systems, fo-
cusing on security-oriented operational practices by VoIP providers and operators. Such
practices include the separation of VoIP and data traffic by using VLANs and similar
techniques, the use of integrity and authentication for configuration bootstrapping of
VoIP devices, authentication of signaling via TLS or IPsec, and the use of media en-
cryption. They briefly describe how two specific commercial systems implement such
practices, and propose some directions for future research.
Adelsbach et al. [2] provide a comprehensive description of SIP and H.323, a list
of threats across all networking layers, and various protection mechanisms. A simi-
lar analysis was published by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [20]. Anwar et al. [3] identify some areas where the NIST report remains
incomplete: counter-intuitive results with respect to the relative performance of encryp-
tion and hash algorithms, the non-use of the standardized Mean Opinion Score to eval-
uate call quality, and the lack of anticipation of RTP-based denial of service. They then
propose the use of design patterns to address the problems of secure traversal of fire-
walls and NAT boxes, detecting and mitigating DoS attacks in VoIP, and securing VoIP
against eavesdropping.
Seedorf [45] overviews the security challenges in peer-to-peer (P2P) SIP. Threats
specific to P2P-SIP include subversion of the identity-mapping scheme (which is spe-
cific to the overlay network used as a substrate), attacks on the overlay network routing
scheme, bootstrapping communications in the presence of malicious first-contact nodes,
identity enforcement (Sybil attacks), traffic analysis and privacy violation by interme-
diate nodes, and free riding by nodes that refuse to route calls or otherwise participate
in the protocol other than to obtain service for themselves (selfish behavior).
Addressing social threats (49 items) Niccolini [29] discusses the difficulties in
protecting against IP telephony spam (SPIT) and overviews the various approaches
for blocking such calls, identifying the technical and operational problems with each.
Possible building blocks for SPIT prevention include black/whitelists combined with
strong identity verification to provide a reliable CallerID system, referral-based systems
among trusted SIP domains, pattern or anomaly detection techniques to discriminate
SPIT based on training data, multi-level grey-listing of calls based on caller behavior
(similar to throttling), computational puzzles and CAPTCHAs, explicit callee consent
(a form of capability, required to actually place a call), content filtering on voicemail
spam, callee feedback to indicate whether a call was SPIT or legitimate (typically com-
bined with white/blacklisting, and requiring strong identity), changing one’s SIP ad-
dress as soon as SPIT messages arrive, requiring a monetary fee for the first contact,
and legal action. Niccolini argues that none of these methods by itself is likely to suc-
ceed, promotes a modular and extensible approach to SPIT prevention, and presents a
high-level architecture that was designed for use in a commercial SIP router. Mathieu
et al. [27] describe SDRS, an anti-SPIT system that combines several of these detection
schemes and takes into consideration user and operator preferences.
The SPIDER project (SPam over Internet telephony Detection sERvice) released
a public project report [38] providing an overview of SPIT threats and the relevant
European legal framework (both on an EU and national basis). The second public
project report [25] focuses on SPIT detection and prevention, summarizing some of
the work done in this space and defining criteria for evaluating the efficiency of anti-
SPIT mechanisms. They then classify prior work according to fulfillment of these cri-
teria, expanding on the relative strengths and weaknesses of each approach. The third
public project report [37] builds on the previous two reports, describing an anti-SPIT
architectural framework. Elements of this architecture include improved authentica-
tion, white/blacklisting, behavior analysis, the use of computational puzzles for chal-
lenge/response, reputation management, and audio content analysis.
Po¨rschmann and Knospe [34] propose a SPIT detection mechanism based on apply-
ing spectral analysis to the audio data of VoIP calls to create acoustic fingerprints. SPIT
is identified by detecting several fingerprints across a large number of different calls.
Schlegel et al. [44] describe a framework for preventing SPIT. They argue for a
modular approach to identifying SPIT, using hints from both signaling and media trans-
fer. The first stage of their system looks at information that is available prior to accept-
ing the call, while the second stage interacts with a caller (possibly prior to passing
on the call to the callee). The various components integrated in their system include
white/blacklists, call statistics, IP/domain correlation, and Turing tests. Their system
also allows for feedback from the callee to be integrated into the scoring mechanism,
for use in screening future calls. The evaluation focuses on scalability, by measuring
the response time to calls as call volumes increase.
Quittek et al. [35] propose the use of hidden Turing tests to identify SPIT callers.
As a concrete approach, they leverage the interaction model in human conversation
minimizes the amount of simultaneous (“double”) talk by the participants, and the fact
that there is a short pause at the beginning of an answered call, followed by a statement
by the callee that initiates the conversation. By looking for signs of violation of such
norms, it is possible to identify naı¨ve automated SPIT callers. The authors implement
their scheme and integrated it with a VoIP firewall.
Dantu and Kolan [17] describe the Voice Spam Detector (VSD), a multi-stage SPIT
filter based on trust, reputation, and feedback among the various filter stages. The pri-
mary filter stages are call pattern and volume analysis, black and white lists of callers,
per-caller behavior profile based on Bayesian classification and prior history, and repu-
tation information from the callee’s contacts and social network. They provide a formal
model for trust and reputation in a voice network, based on intuitive human behavior.
They evaluate their system in a laboratory experiment using a small number of real
users and injected SPIT calls.
Kolan et al. [18] use traces of voice calls in a university environment to validate a
mathematical model for computing the nuisance level of an incoming call, using feed-
back from the receivers. The model is intended to be used in predicting SPIT calls in
VoIP environments, and is based on the history of prior communications between the
two parties involved, which includes explicit feedback from the receiver indicating that
a call is unwanted (at a particular point in time).
Balasubramaniyan et al. [4] propose to use call duration and social network graphs
to establish a measure of reputation for callers. Their intuition is that users whose call
graph has a relatively small fan-out and whose call durations are relatively long are less
likely to be spammers. Conversely, users who place a lot of very short calls are likely
to be engaging in SPIT. Furthermore, spammers will receive few (if any) calls. Their
system works both when the parties in a call have a social network link between them,
and when such a link does not exist by assigning global reputation scores. Users that are
mistakenly categorized as spammers are redirected to a Turing test, allowing them to
complete the call if the answer correctly. In a simulation-based evaluation, the authors
determine that their system can achieve a false negative rate of 10% and a false positive
rate of 3%, even in the presence of large numbers of spammers.
Srivastava and Schulzrinne [49] describe DAPES, a system for blocking SPIT calls
and instant messages based on several factors, including the origin domain of the ini-
tiator (caller), the confidence level in the authentication performed (if any), whether the
call is coming through a known open proxy, and a reputation system for otherwise un-
known callers. They give an overview of other reputation-based systems and compare
them with DAPES.
Addressing eavesdropping, interception, and modification threats (34 items) Wang
et al. [55] evaluate the resilience of three commercial VoIP services (AT&T, Vonage
and Gizmo) against man-in-the-middle adversaries. They show that it is possible for
an attacker to divert and redirect calls in the first two services by modifying the RTP
endpoint information included in the SDP exchange (which is not protected by the SIP
Digest Authentication), and to manipulate a user’s call forwarding settings in the latter
two systems. These vulnerabilities permit for large-scale voice pharming, where unsus-
pecting users are directed to fake interactive voice response systems or human repre-
sentatives. The authors argue for the need for TLS or IPsec protection of the signaling.
Zhang et al. [62] show that, by exploiting DNS and VoIP implementation vulnerabili-
ties, it is possible for attackers to perform man-in-the-middle attacks even when they are
not on the direct communication path of the parties involved. They demonstrate their
attack against Vonage, requiring that the attacker only knows the phone number and the
IP address of the target phone. Such attacks can be used to eavesdrop and hijack the
victims’ VoIP calls. The authors recommend that users and operators use signaling and
media protection, conduct fuzzing and testing of VoIP implementations, and develop a
lightweight VoIP intrusion detection system to be deployed on the VoIP phone.
Salsano et al. [43] give an overview of the various SIP security mechanisms (as of
2002), focusing particularly on the authentication component. They conduct an eval-
uation of the processing costs of SIP calls that involve authentication, under different
transport, authentication and encryption scenarios. They show that a call using TLS
and authentication is 2.56 times more expensive than the simplest possible SIP config-
uration (UDP, no security). However, a fully-protected a call takes only 54% longer to
complete than a configuration that is more representative than the basic one but still
offers no security; the same fully-protected call and has the same processing cost if the
transport is TCP without any encryption (TLS). Of the overhead, approximately 70%
is attributed to message parsing and 30% to cryptographic processing. With the advent
of Datagram TLS (DTLS), it is possible that encryption and integrity for SIP can be
had for all configurations (UDP or TCP) at no additional cost. A similar conclusion
is reached by Bilien et al. [6], who study the overhead in SIP call setup latency when
using end-to-end and hop-by-hop security mechanisms. They consider protocols such
as MIKEY, S/MIME, SRTP, TLS, and IPsec, concluding that the overall penalty of us-
ing full-strength cryptography is low. Barbieri et al. [5] had found earlier that when
using VoIP over IPsec, performance can drop by up to 63%; however, it is questionable
whether these results still hold, given the use of hardware accelerators and the more
efficient AES algorithm in IPsec.
Rebahi et al. [39] analyze the performance of RSA as used in SIP for authentica-
tion and identity management (via public-key certificates and digital signatures), and
describe the use of Elliptic Curve DSA (ECDSA) within this context to improve perfor-
mance. Using ECDSA, their prototype can handle from 2 to 8 times as many call setup
requests per second, with the gap widening as key sizes increase.
Guo et al. [14] propose a new scheme for protecting voice content that provides
strong confidentiality guarantees while allowing for graceful voice degradation in the
presence of packet loss. They evaluate their scheme via simulation and micro-benchmarks.
However, Li et al. [23] show that the scheme is insecure. Kuntze et al. [21] propose a
mechanism for providing non-repudiation of voice content by using digital signatures.
Seedorf [46] proposes the use of cryptographically generated SIP URIs to protect
the integrity of content in P2P SIP. Specifically, he uses self-certifying SIP URIs that
encode a public key (or, more compactly, the hash of a public key). The owner of the
corresponding private key can then post signed location binding information on the
peer-to-peer network (e.g., Chord) that is used by call initiators to perform call routing.
Petraschek et al. [33] examine the usability and security of ZRTP, a key agreement
protocol based on the Diffie Hellman key exchange, designed for use in VoIP environ-
ments that lack pre-established secret keys among users or a public key infrastructure
(PKI). ZRTP is intended to be used with SRTP, which performs the actual content en-
cryption and transfer. Because of the lack of a solid basis for authentication, which
makes active man-in-the-middle attacks easy to launch, ZRTP uses Short Authentica-
tion Strings (SAS) to allow two users to verbally confirm that they have established the
same secret key. The verbal communication serves as a weak form of authentication at
the human level. The authors identify a relay attack in ZRTP, wherein a man-in-the-
middle adversary can influence the SAS read by two legitimate users with who he has
established independent calls and ZRTP exchanges. The attacker can use one of the
legitimate users as an oracle to pronounce the desired SAS string through a number
of means, including social engineering. The authors point out that SAS does not offer
any security in some communication scenarios with high security requirements, e.g.,
a user calling (or being called by) their bank. The authors implement their attack and
demonstrate it in a lab environment.
Wright et al. [58] apply machine learning techniques to determine the language
spoken in a VoIP conversation, when a variable bit rate (VBR) voice codec is used
based on the length of the encrypted voice frame. As a countermeasure, they propose the
use of block ciphers for encrypting the voice. In follow-on work [57], they use profile
Hidden Markov Models to identify specific phrases in the encrypted voice stream with
a 50% average accuracy, rising to 90% for certain phrases.
Addressing denial of service threats (19 items) Rafique et al. [36] analyze the ro-
bustness and reliability of SIP servers under DoS attacks. They launch a number of
synthesized attacks against four well-known SIP proxy servers (OpenSER, PartySIP,
OpenSBC, and MjServer). Their results demonstrate the ease with which SIP servers
can be overloaded with call requests, causing such performance metrics as Call Com-
pletion Rate, Call Establishment Latency, Call Rejection Ration and Number of Re-
transmitted Requests to deteriorate rapidly as attack volume increases, sometimes with
as few as 1,000 packets/second. As an extreme case of such attacks large volumes of IN-
VITE messages can even cause certain implementations to crash. While documenting
the susceptibility to such attacks, this work proposes no defense strategies or directions.
Reynolds and Ghosal [40] describe a multi-layer protection scheme against flood-
based application- and transport-layer denial of service (DoS) attacks in VoIP. They use
a combination of sensors located across the enterprise network, continuously estimating
the deviation from the long-term average of the number of call setup requests and suc-
cessfully completed handshakes. Similar techniques have been used in detecting TCP
SYN flood attacks, with good results. The authors evaluate their scheme via simulation,
considering several different types of DoS attacks and recovery models.
Ormazabal et al. [31] describe the design and implementation of a SIP-aware, rule-
based application-layer firewall that can handle denial of service (and other) attacks in
the signaling and media protocols. They use hardware acceleration for the rule match-
ing component, allowing them to achieving filtering rates on the order of hundreds of
transactions per second. The SIP-specific rules, combined with state validation of the
endpoints, allow the firewall to open precisely the ports needed for only the local and
remote addresses involved in a specific session, by decomposing and analyzing the con-
tent and meaning of SIP signaling message headers. They experimentally evaluate and
validate the behavior of their prototype with a distributed testbed involving synthetic
benign and attack traffic generation.
Larson et al. [22] experimentally analyzed the impact of distributed denial of ser-
vice (DDoS) attacks on VoIP call quality. They also established the effectiveness of
low-rate denial of service attacks that target specific vulnerabilities and implementa-
tion artifacts to cause equipment crashes and reboots. They discuss some of the possi-
ble defenses against such attacks and describe Sprint’s approach, which uses regional
“cleaning centers” which divert suspected attack traffic to a centralized location with
numerous screening and mitigation mechanisms available. They recommend that crit-
ical VoIP traffic stay on private networks, the use of general DDoS mechanisms as
a front-line defense, VoIP-aware DDoS detection and mitigation mechanisms, traffic
policing and rate-limiting mechanisms, the use of TCP for VoIP signaling, extended
protocol compliance checking by VoIP network elements, and the use of authentication
mechanisms where possible.
Sengar et al. [47] describe vFDS, an anomaly detection system that seeks to identify
flooding denial of service attacks in VoIP. The approach taken is to measure abnormal
variations in the relationships between related packet streams using the Hellinger dis-
tance, a measure of the deviation between two probability measures. Using synthetic
attacks, they show that vFDS can detect flooding attacks that use SYN, SIP, or RTP
packets within approximately 1 second of the commencement of an attack, with small
impact on call setup latency and voice quality.
Conner and Nahrstedt [9] describe a semantic-level attack that causes resource ex-
haustion on stateful SIP proxies by calling parties that (legitimately or in collusion) do
not respond. This attack does not require network flooding or other high traffic volume
attacks, making it difficult to detect with simple, network-based heuristics used against
other types of denial of service attacks. They propose a simple algorithm, called Ran-
dom Early Termination (RET) for releasing reserved resources based on the current
state of the proxy (overloaded or not) and the duration of each call’s ringing. They im-
plement and evaluate their proposed scheme on a SIP proxy running in a local testbed,
showing that it reduces the number of benign call failures when under attack, without
incurring measurable overheads when no attack is underway.
Zhang et al. [61] describe a denial of service attack wherein adversaries flood SIP
servers with calls involving URIs with DNS names that do not exist. Servers attempting
to resolve them will then have to wait until the request times out (either locally or at their
DNS server), before they can continue processing the same or another call. This attack
works against servers that perform synchronous DNS resolution and only maintain a
limited number of execution threads. They experimentally show that as few as 1,000
messages per second can cause a well provisioned synchronous-resolution server to
exhibit very high call drops, while simple, single-threaded servers can be starved with
even 1 message per second. As a countermeasure, they propose the use of non-blocking
DNS caches, which they prototype and evaluate.
Luo et al. [24] experimentally evaluate the susceptibility of SIP to CPU-based de-
nial of service attacks. They use an open-source SIP server in four attack scenarios:
basic request flooding, spoofed-nonce flooding (wherein the target server is forced to
validate the authenticator in a received message), adaptive-nonce flooding (where the
nonce is refreshed periodically by obtaining a new one from the server), and adaptive-
nonce flooding with IP spoofing. Their measurements show that these attacks can have
a large impact on the quality of service provided by the servers. They propose several
countermeasures to mitigate against such attacks, indicating that authentication by itself
cannot solve the problem and that, in some circumstances, it can exacerbate its sever-
ity. These mitigation mechanisms include lightweight authentication and whitelisting,
proper choice of authentication parameters, and binding nonces to client IP addresses.
Addressing service abuse threats (8 items) Zhang et al. [63] present a number of
exploitable vulnerabilities in SIP that can manipulate billing records in a number of
ways, showing their applicability against real commercial VoIP providers. Their focus
is primarily on attacks that create billing inconsistencies, e.g., customers being charged
for service they did not receive, or over-charged for service received. Some of these
attacks require a man-in-the-middle capability, while others only require some prior
interaction with the target (e.g., receiving a call from the victim SIP phone device).
Abdelnur et al. [1] use AVISPA to identify a protocol-level vulnerability in the way
SIP handles authentication [50]. AVISPA is a model checker for validating security
protocols and applications using a high-level protocol specification and security-goals
language that gets compiler into an intermediate format that can be consumed by a
number of lower-level checkers. The attack is possible with the SIP Digest Authenti-
cation, whereby an adversary can reuse another party’s credentials to obtain unautho-
rized access to SIP or PSTN services (such as calling a premium or international phone
line). This attack is possible because authentication may be requested in response to an
INVITE message at any time during a call, and the responder may issue an INVITE
message during a call either automatically (because of timer expirations) or through a
user action (e.g., placing the caller on hold in order to do a call transfer). While the
solution is simple, it requires changes possibly to all end-device SIP implementations.
This work is part of a bigger effort to apply testing and fuzzing toward identifying vul-
nerabilities in SIP protocols, implementations, and deployed systems. It is worth noting
that this work has resulted in a number of vulnerability disclosures in the Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database and elsewhere.
Cross-cutting efforts (51 items) Wieser et al. [56] extend the PROTOS testsuite with
a SIP-specific analysis fuzzing module. They then test their system against a number of
commercial SIP implementations, finding critical vulnerabilities in all of them.
Gupta and Shmatikov [15] formally analyze the security of the VoIP protocol stack,
including SIP, SDP, ZRTP, MIKEY, SDES, and SRTP. Their analysis uncovers a num-
ber of flaws, most of which derive from subtle inconsistencies in the assumptions made
in designing the different protocols. These include a replay attack in SDES that com-
pletely break content protection, a man-in-the-middle attack in ZRTP, and a (perhaps
theoretical) weakness in the key derivation process used in MIKEY. They also show
several minor weaknesses and vulnerabilities in all protocols that enable DoS attacks.
Dantu et al. [12] describe a comprehensive VoIP security architecture, composed
of components distributed across the media gateway controller, the proxy server(s), the
IP PBX, and end-user equipment. These components explicitly exchange information
toward better training of filters, and creating and maintaining white/blacklists. Implicit
feedback is also provided through statistical analysis of interactions (e.g., call frequency
and duration). The architecture also provisions for a recovery mechanism that incorpo-
rates explicit feedback and quarantining.
Wu et al. [59] design an intrusion detection system, called SCIDIVE, that is spe-
cific to VoIP environments. SCIDIVE aims to detect different classes of intrusions, can
operate with different viewpoints (on clients, proxies, or servers), and takes into consid-
eration both signaling (i.e., SIP) and media-transfer protocols (e.g., RTP). SCIDIVE’s
ability to correlate cross-protocol behavior, theoretically allows for detection of more
complex attacks. However, the system is rules-based, which limits its effectiveness
against new/unknown attacks. In follow-on work, Wu et al. [60] develop SPACEDIVE,
a VoIP-specific intrusion detection system that allows for correlation of events among
distributed rules-based detectors. They demonstrate the ability of SPACEDIVE to de-
tect certain classes of attacks using a simple SIP environment with two domains, and
compare it with SCIDIVE.
Niccolini et al. [30] design an intrusion detection/intrusion prevention system archi-
tecture for use with SIP. Their system uses both knowledge-based and behavior-based
detection, arranged as a series in that order. They develop a prototype implementation
using the open-source Snort IDS. They evaluate the effectiveness of their system in an
attack scenario by measuring the mean end-to-end delay of legitimate SIP traffic in the
presence of increasing volumes of malformed SIP INVITE messages.
Nassar et al. [28] advocate the use of SIP-specific honeypots to catch attacks target-
ing the Internet telephony systems, protocols and applications. They design and imple-
ment such a honeypot system, and explore the use of a statistical engine for identifying
attacks and other misbehavior, based on training on legitimate traces of SIP traffic. The
engine is based on their prior work that uses Bayesian-based inference. The resulting
SIP honeypot effort is largely exploratory, with performance and effectiveness evalua-
tions left for future work.
Rieck et al. [41] apply machine learning techniques to detecting anomalous SIP
messages, incorporating a “self-learning” component by allowing for periodic re-training
of the anomaly detector using traffic that has been flagged as normal. The features used
for clustering are based on n-grams and on tokenization of the SIP protocol. To prevent
training attacks, wherein an adversary “trains” the anomaly detector to accept mali-
cious inputs are legitimate, they employ randomization (choosing random samples for
the training set), sanitization [10], and verification (by comparing the output of the new
and old training models). Their experimental prototype was shown to handle 70 Mbps
of SIP traffic, while providing a 99% detection rate with no false positives.
SNOCER, a project funded by the European Union, is “investigating approaches for
overcoming temporal network, hardware and software failures and ensuring the high
availability of the offered VoIP services based on low cost distributed concepts.” The
first public project report [48] provides an overview of VoIP infrastructure components
and the threats that must be addressed (staying primarily at the protocol and network
level, and avoiding implementation issues with the exception of SQL injection), along
with possible defense mechanisms. There is also discussion on scalable service provi-
sioning (replication, redundancy, backups etc.), toward providing reliability and fault
tolerance. The second public project report [11] describes an architecture for protecting
against malformed messages and related attacks using specification-based intrusion de-
tection, protocol message verification, and redundancy. They use ontologies to describe
SIP vulnerabilities, to allow for easy updating of the monitoring components (IDS) [13].
Marshall et al. [26] describe the AT&T VoIP security architecture. They divide VoIP
equipment into three classes: trusted, trusted-but-vulnerable, and untrusted. The latter
consists of the customer premises equipment, which is outside the control of the carrier.
The trusted domain includes all the servers necessary to provide VoIP service. Between
the two sit various border and security elements, that are responsible for protecting the
trusted devices while permitting legitimate communications to proceed. They describe
the interactions among the various components, and the security mechanisms used in
protecting these interactions.
5 Discussion
In our previous work [16], we surveyed over 200 vulnerabilities in SIP implementa-
tions that had been disclosed in the CVE database from 1999 to 2009. We classified
these vulnerabilities along several dimensions, including the VoIPSA threat taxonomy,
the traditional {Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability} concerns, and a {Protocol, Im-
plementation, Configuration} axis. We found that the various types of denial of service
attacks constitute the majority of disclosed vulnerabilities, over 90% of which were due
to implementation problems and 7% due to configuration.
Considering the research work we have surveyed (some of which was discussed in
this paper), we can see that out of a total of 197 publications, 18% concern themselves
with an overview of the problem space and of solutions — a figure we believe is rea-
sonable, considering the enormity of the problem space and the speed of change in the
protocols, standards, and implementations. We also see a considerable amount of effort
(roughly 25%) going toward addressing SPIT. While SPIT is not a major issue at this
point, our experience with email spam and telemarketing seems to provide sufficient
motivation for research in this area. Much of the work is focused on identifying SPIT
calls and callers based on behavioral traits, although a number of other approaches are
under exploration (e.g., real-time content analysis). One of the problems is the lack of
a good corpus of data for experimentation and validation of the proposed techniques.
We were also not surprised to see a sizable portion of research (17%) directed at
design, analysis (both security- and performance-oriented), and attacking of crypto-
graphic protocols as used in VoIP. The cryptographic research community appears to be
reasonably comfortable in proposing tweaks and minor improvements to the basic au-
thentication mechanisms, and the systems community appears content with analyzing
the performance of different protocol configurations (e.g., TLS vs. IPsec). With a few
notable exceptions, much of the work lacks “ambition.”
Most distressing, however, is the fact that comparatively little research (9.6%) is go-
ing toward addressing the problem of denial of service. Given the numerical dominance
of SIP-specific DoS vulnerabilities (as described earlier) and the ease of launching such
attacks, it is clear that significantly more work is needed here. What work is being done
seems to primarily focus on the server and infrastructure side, despite our finding that
half of DoS-related vulnerabilities are present on endpoints. Furthermore, much of the
existing work focuses on network-observable attacks (e.g., “obviously” malformed SIP
messages), whereas the majority of VoIP DoS vulnerabilities are the result of implemen-
tation failures. More generally, additional work is needed in strengthening implemen-
tations, rather than introducing middleboxes and network intrusion detection systems,
whose effectiveness has been shown to be limited in other domains; taking a black box
approach in securing VoIP systems is, in our opinion, not going to be sufficient.
Also disconcerting is the lack of research (4%) in addressing service abuse threats,
considering the high visibility of large fraud incidents [19,51,52]. In general, we found
little work that took a “big picture” view of the VoIP security problem. What cross-
cutting architectures have been proposed focus primarily on intrusion detection. Work
is desperately needed to address cross-implementation and cross-protocol problems,
above and beyond the few efforts along those lines in the intrusion detection space.
Finally, we note that none of the surveyed works addressed the problem of configu-
ration management. While such problems represent only 7% of known vulnerabilities,
configuration issues are easy to overlook and are likely under-represented in our previ-
ous analysis due to the nature of vulnerability reporting.
6 Conclusions
We have presented a survey of VoIP security research. While space restrictions pre-
vent us from discussing all surveyed works, we have discussed a representative subset
of these. We presented an initial classification using the VoIPSA threat taxonomy, and
juxtaposed this against our previous analysis on VoIP security vulnerabilities. We iden-
tified two specific areas (denial of service and service abuse) as being under-represented
in terms of research efforts directed at them (relative to their importance in the vulnera-
bility survey), and called for additional effort at securing implementations and configu-
rations, rather than taking a black-box approach of VoIP systems. We intend to expand
on this work and offer a more comprehensive analysis in the near future.
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